The past as present: war crimes, impunity and the rule of law by Gossman, Patricia
  
Patricia Gossman  
The past as present: war crimes, impunity 
and the rule of law 
 
Conference Item [paper] 
Original citation: 
Originally presented at State reconstruction and international engagement in Afghanistan, 30 
May - 1 June 2003, London School of Economics and Political Science and University of Bonn. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28365/
 
Available in LSE Research Online: June 2010 
 
© 2003 Patricia Gossman 
 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
The Past as Present: War Crimes, Impunity and the Rule of Law  
 
Symposium: State Reconstruction and International Engagement on Afghanistan 
Sponsored by the Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, and Crisis 
States Programme, Development Research Centre, London School of Economics 
 
30 May-1 June, 2003 
 
Patricia Gossman 
Project Director 
Afghanistan Justice Project 
 
 
 
Several weeks ago in Geneva, at the annual meeting of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, a heated debate took place behind the scenes over a proposal to establish 
an international commission of inquiry to look into past war crimes in Afghanistan. Much 
of the debate centered on whether the time was ripe in Afghanistan to begin seriously 
discussing how to address the past, with some participants pushing for a strong 
resolution, others opposing any action at this time.  In the end, that proposal was 
withdrawn, to the bitter disappointment of Afghan human rights activists and the new 
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), which has been receiving a 
steady number of unsolicited complaints from Afghans about past abuses. The country 
responsible for the proposal’s defeat was the US, who worked to see that the UN 
Commission on Human Rights issued no resolution on human rights in Afghanistan. This 
session of the UN Commission was a disaster for human rights in many countries, but by 
blocking any resolution on human rights in Afghanistan – and there has been a resolution 
most years going back to Soviet times—the US signaled that its priorities did not include 
accountability for either past or ongoing human rights abuses. It’s a position that belies 
the reality Afghans live with every day, and one that will ultimately undermine the 
stability the US seeks in the region.  
The proposal on a commission of inquiry was quite cautiously worded, and did 
not spell out any particular mechanism, judicial or non-judicial, for addressing past 
crimes.  Instead, it advocated an approach that would involve international experts to 
begin mapping the major incidents of the past.  Whether this would involve  putting 
together what is already documented, or undertaking new research in Afghanistan was 
not specified.  There is general consensus among those involved in thinking about the 
problem of transitional justice in Afghanistan that some kind of stocktaking and analysis 
of sources and existing documentation would be an important part of creating a record 
that Afghans can use whenever there is an opportunity to pursue the truth and some 
measure of justice.   
Such a record could be a first step in what will inevitably be a lengthy struggle by 
Afghans to account for the long legacy of war and atrocity in their country. Good 
documentation need not at this stage lead to specific recommendations about future 
mechanisms to deal with individuals responsible for crimes until there is some measure 
of public debate about the issue, and there are institutions better equipped to address the 
problem.  But if this stocktaking is actually going to represent a step in a process, and not 
just a gesture to assuage the consciences of some in the international community, then it 
must be done in such a way that it serves that objective for Afghans.  A report that relies 
solely on documentation that is already available—and does not  make use of more direct 
sources including witness testimony—runs  the risk of producing something that would 
ultimately represent far less than what most Afghans already know about what happened 
in their country over the 23-year war. It could also be dangerously skewed. Published 
material about specific abuses is uneven in its coverage of the war. Little has been 
documented about specific incidents from 1978 and 1979. International human rights 
groups did not begin to produce reports until well into the 1980s. Deterred by the 
difficulty and dangers of investigating violations after Kabul descended into chaos in 
1992,  human rights groups did very little monitoring and documentation in that period. 
And even with the international interest in Taliban abuses with respect to women, most 
massacres carried out by Taliban forces went unremarked by the international press.  
On the diplomatic front, the US and its allies condemned human rights violations 
by Soviet forces and their Afghan counterparts during that phase of the war, but there was 
little political engagement on Afghanistan among Western countries after the Soviet 
withdrawal.  Thus,  the atrocities that took place, including mass rape, systematic 
summary executions and indiscriminate shelling, largely escaped scrutiny. Those 
responsible for the abuses of this period include many leaders who have returned to 
power either directly or indirectly as a consequence of the Bonn Agreement. A UN report 
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that fails to include those abuses could be used by members of the current transitional 
administration, and international actors, including UN officials who have opposed 
digging up the past, to close the door on any future efforts toward accountability. All this 
is not to say that a good report that documents past abuses cannot be done. It depends on 
how it is done and how it relates to sentiments and activities of Afghans engaged on the 
issue.   
The proposal for a commission of inquiry came from the report of Asma Jahangir, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, who is mandated by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights to examine situations of extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions and to submit her findings, together with conclusions and 
recommendations.1  The proposal was included as a recommendation in the report on her 
mission to Afghanistan which took place late last year.  But even though the proposal 
itself came out of a UN body, it has been difficult in this period to find anyone at the UN 
Assistance Mission on Afghanistan (UNAMA) who acknowledged knowing much about 
it.  There is surprisingly little communication between UNAMA and Geneva, little 
consultation with the AIHRC, and little transparency within the UN on the subject.  
This is part of a pattern. An unfortunate consequence of the Geneva debate has 
been to push discussions of transitional justice in Afghanistan even further off the 
international agenda. Indeed, the issue has become a taboo subject among the assistance 
and diplomatic communities in Kabul—discussed in private offices, or homes but not in 
public forums. Even in those private deliberations, there is apprehension that too much 
talk about accountability for the past might drive commanders to abandon politics and 
return to the battlefield. But in the absence of any pressure from the international 
community on human rights, some political leaders who have been responsible for 
serious war crimes have been emboldened, and are consolidating their strength in Kabul 
or elsewhere to dominate the constitutional process, the judicial reform process, 
government appointments and other crucial pieces of the political process. Rather than 
return to the battlefield, they are closing out any space for public debate and participation.  
                                                          
1 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms. Asma Jahangir, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human 
Rights resolution 2002/36, Addendum: MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN (13 to 23 October 2002), 
E/CN.4/2003/3/Add.4, 3 February 2003. 
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To argue that this is the best we can expect in Afghanistan—an argument heard from US 
and UN officials after the Emergency Loya Jirga last year—is dangerously short-sighted.   
A comparison with other examples of societies dealing with transitional justice 
issue demonstrates that there are clear advantages to beginning a process as soon as 
possible after the onset of the “transition.” No country that has dealt with a legacy of 
repression and serious violations of international humanitarian law has done so without 
the threat of renewed conflict or reprisal.  But experience shows that if a process is not 
started relatively soon after a transition, the momentum to do so, and the international and 
public support for it may evaporate. In addition, the more delay, the more likely that 
some evidence will be tampered with or destroyed.2  
Those who argue that it is too soon to take steps on transitional justice contend 
that the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission is not a representative 
institution and there is no consensus among Afghans about what should be done. Some 
argue that it is inappropriate for foreigners to be involved, and that if Afghans alone 
cannot take this on, then it is not time for it to be done at all. Ironically, it is foreigners 
who are making this argument, and one could reasonably ask why foreigners should 
make that decision for Afghans, particularly when foreigners armed, and continue to arm 
some of the very parties who committed atrocities, and are thus also implicated in the 
crimes. The choice is really between an appropriate role for foreigners, or one that would 
have foreigners dictating what should or should not be done. Foreigners can play a vital 
role particularly in specific areas of investigation and advocacy. No foreign involvement 
can or should replace what Afghans themselves will have to do if they are going to figure 
out some way to address the growing popular demand for reconciliation and justice.  
The AIHRC only began its work at the beginning of this year, but it has already 
received more than fifty specific complaints related to past abuses. The Commission is 
under pressure particularly in some districts to tackle the issue more forthrightly. In my 
experience working on this issue inside Afghanistan it is the foreigners for the most part 
who are cautious, not those Afghans who have waited a very long time for anyone to hear 
their story.  In some cases, the AIHRC and others I know working on the issue feel they 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
2 For a thorough discussion of truth commissions, see Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting 
State Terror and Atrocity (London: Routledge, 2001), especially pp. 220-222. 
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have to act as a brake on the demands coming from Afghans.  The demand for ways to 
address the past is likely to increase this year as various institutions—including the 
AIHRC—begin to grapple with the question, and as the run-up to the elections inevitably 
raises the problem the Emergency Loya Jirga was unable to handle: whether and how to 
exclude as candidates those responsible for war crimes. 
At the time of the establishment of the AIHRC, discussions on transitional justice 
centered on the need for two parallel initiatives: one to begin documentation, and one to 
begin consultation with the aim being that by the time substantial documentation had 
been carried out, there would be a clearer sense of what the “Afghan street” thought 
about these things. Unfortunately, neither initiative has yet gotten off the ground. Without 
international support neither will. The constitution making process is also meant to 
involve national consultation, as specified in the Bonn Agreement, but there is little 
evidence that anyone at UNAMA has given serious thought to planning for what that 
would involve both in terms of financial resources and technical assistance. The AIHRC 
will also need support—political as much as financial—if it is to survey  views about 
what can be done about the past and when. No one knows yet what will emerge from any 
such survey, but preliminary discussions indicate that Afghans who are thinking about 
the issue are aware that questions of guilt and innocence, justice and reconciliation are 
complex and cannot be resolved by simply importing mechanisms that have worked 
elsewhere. They are equally aware that one can draw a distinction between the larger 
numbers of individuals who may have committed crimes during factional fighting but 
who were not in positions of authority, and a smaller number of individuals who either 
ordered  or acquiesced in crimes against humanity and serious war crimes committed by 
troops under their command. These would include massacres of civilians or other non-
combatants, mass rapes, systematic torture and summary execution, and wanton 
destruction of the sources of livelihood for entire communities.  
Those who are resistant to tackling the issue at all point out that some Afghans 
will see it as a campaign against the mujahidin as a whole, and discredit any effort aimed 
at accountability on those grounds. But it is at the very least disingenuous if those in the 
international community who know better accept that argument at face value. Afghans 
certainly know that all mujahidin did not resort to crimes like rape and massacring 
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civilians, though some of them did. People I have worked with on this tell me that many 
Afghans are quite cognizant of the difference between those who ordered the mass 
killings and those in the lower ranks who may have engaged in other crimes during some 
of the factional fighting. Afghans involved in discussions on transitional justice are 
thinking about different ways that justice and reconciliation might be achieved, 
depending on the kind of crimes and the position of authority the alleged perpetrator 
occupied.  
Unfortunately, there has been a dangerous tendency lately among diplomats and 
UN staff in Kabul to adopt a selective vocabulary when talking about security and human 
rights, distinguishing between the “government” and the “warlords” outside Kabul, with 
the latter identified as the problem.  This would appear to exonerate those in the 
transitional administration who have abused their authority. What horrifies many 
Afghans is that those who were in command of operations in which civilians were 
deliberately targeted, or who ordered mass summary executions, appear to operate now—
as they so often did in the past—with  the assent if not the support of the international 
community. At one end are those commanders who have received military support from 
the US, despite evidence of their involvement in past or current abuses. At the other end 
are those political leaders or commanders who are also implicated in war crimes, but who 
have taken up positions of authority in Kabul or elsewhere with little sign of protest from 
the UN or diplomatic community.  Certainly, very senior figures would be difficult to 
dislodge at this point, but one does not have to start at the top to begin to get a message 
across. 
The bitterness that many Afghans feel about what they perceive as the 
indifference of the rest of the world to the legacy of the war – not just to the suffering 
wrought by any prolonged war, but the specific, targeted killings carried out  by 
commanders known to them, with names, ranks and clear chains of command,  many of 
whom walk the streets of Kabul, or haunt certain neighborhoods of Quetta, or visit certain 
cafés in Delft or Hamburg—was brought pointedly to my attention when I visited Kabul 
in the summer of 2000. It was the first time I had visited Kabul since the Taliban had 
taken control, and I was there researching how humanitarian organizations were dealing 
with (or not) human rights concerns. I was interviewing a Hazara man, who was the 
 6 
community leader for that part of west Kabul. After describing numerous cases of young 
Hazara men being detained and jailed by the Taliban for the purposes of extortion, of 
Taliban police beating and threatening Hazara merchants in order to seize their property,  
we talked about the legacy of war crimes not only by the Taliban but by the parties that 
had fought for control of Kabul in the early 1990s. He told me then that the only thing he 
feared more than the Taliban was if those who had fought over Kabul in the early 1990s 
came back.  He wanted to know why the “international community” was silent about 
these abuses. Of course, the world condemned the Taliban’s treatment of women, but not 
the massacres and other war crimes.   
International human rights advocacy on Afghanistan has always been selective, 
with gender discrimination the only issue on which the international community appears 
capable of sustained attention. The Geneva Accords that finalized the agreement on the 
Soviet withdrawal made no provision for addressing war crimes; later, no one but the 
ICRC complained very loudly about the horrific abuses of the 1992-95 period. The role 
of the UN in dealing with such issues has always been fraught with controversy. When 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights failed to follow through with 
investigations into the massacre of Taliban prisoners in 1997, and the subsequent 
massacre in Mazar-i Sharif by the Taliban in 1998, human rights groups—as well as 
many representatives of the UN and humanitarian groups on the ground—were outraged. 
There is no question that the OHCHR squandered an important opportunity to 
demonstrate the universality of human rights and to show that the UN in particular would 
uphold this principle. But there is enough blame to go around: the OHCHR has also been 
subject to political pressure from other UN agencies as well as member states.  The new 
High Commissioner for Human Rights has signalled his intent to see that some 
documentation of past abuses takes places under the auspices of his office; it remains to 
be seen whether the body entrusted with this task will have the mandate and stature 
required to achieve meaningful results.  
The message that came through for Afghans was that such incidents in their 
country really did not rate very high with anyone in a position to make sure that an 
investigation was done properly. What that incident, and the subsequent failures of the 
UN  to tackle issues of impunity, has done to the reputation of the UN in Afghanistan is 
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not irreparable, but it is compounded by what is happening today: I visited Dasht-i Laili 
in February 2002, and what is striking is not just the evidence of recent mass burials, but 
the fact that the site is layered with victims going back six years or more, and that no one 
has ever managed to find out who they are.  Last year UN investigators came around 
asking questions and once again the UN suspended further work because of security 
concerns. Unfortunately, the pattern that emerges  among the internationals involved in 
these processes is to back off and relinquish ground, sometimes to precisely those persons 
responsible for the lack of security. Raising the question of security is also a way for 
those who do not want an investigation—including states who ought to help provide 
security for the work to continue—to make sure nothing happens.  The risks of 
undertaking an investigation into mass graves in Yakaolang are minimal, but nothing is 
happening there either. If every time there is a threat, the international community 
concedes more space to those responsible for the atrocities in the first place, what has that 
achieved for the Afghans?  
What then can and should be done? U.N. Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi 
has argued that it is far too early to begin talking about “transitional justice” in 
Afghanistan because the government is too weak and the security situation too 
precarious. He also cites the lack of international commitment to peacekeeping and the 
absence of strong judiciary as reasons for avoiding the issue for the foreseeable future. As 
with the Loya Jirga process, he argues that it is impossible to sideline the warlords in 
constructing a new state, and that this is the best that can be done at the present. This 
argument is echoed by some others in the donor community.  
That argument is based on a very short-term vision of Afghanistan’s chances for a 
stable future, and actually aggravates the very security risks and  institutional weaknesses 
cited as reasons for avoiding addressing the past.  Those who benefit most from the 
international community’s silence on accountability for the past include many figures 
with links to criminal and/or extremist networks. Among their ranks are political leaders  
who dominate the security and intelligence machinery, profit hugely from increased 
poppy production, engineer the constitutional process to suit their politics, suppress 
legitimate voices of dissent in the provinces, or incite attacks on foreign aid workers.  
Supporting a process that will lead to some form of transitional justice in Afghanistan is 
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part of supporting institutions that are crucial to Afghanistan’s ability to transition at all 
to a more representative form of government, an opening of political space, a judiciary 
that can begin to address the needs of its people. Silence from the international 
community on the question of accountability in effect erodes the entire process. 
In this critical year before nationwide elections are meant to be held, it is possible 
to begin a process that could assist Afghans in exploring the options available to them, 
and equipping them with the information and training they need to move it forward. Most 
important, beginning a process sends the crucial political signal that accountability is 
central to the rule of law, and that there is genuine international support for at least 
marginalization of the worst perpetrators. Such a process would have the support of many 
Afghans. It would include pursuing multiple approaches, among them: a national 
consultation process on transitional justice spearheaded by the AIHRC; an international 
panel of inquiry to assemble and analyze existing documentation and receive 
submissions, including testimony, about past violations that would work in consultation 
with the AIHRC;  following through with the investigations of mass grave sites in 
Bamiyan, Mazar and, if there is sufficient pressure on  states to provide the necessary 
security, Dasht-i Laili; exposure of more senior figures responsible for war crimes who 
have taken asylum outside the country; and possibly exclusion from public office of 
former lower-to-mid ranking members of political groups about whom there is strong 
evidence of  culpability for war crimes —all  with the aim of creating some momentum 
on the question of transitional justice.  
International human rights advocacy on Afghanistan has up to now always been 
inconsistent and inadequate, delinked from any larger political strategy for securing peace 
and rebuilding the country.  As a consequence, principles and practices essential to 
building the very institutions we expect or at least hope will ultimately provide good 
governance and promote respect for the rule of law have been abandoned. Transitional 
justice is among those concerns supported by Afghans that is in danger of being 
marginalized. But we cannot hope to reverse that process in a vacuum of political 
engagement on human rights at the international level.  
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